Influenza a viruses (IaVs) cause epidemics and pandemics that result in considerable financial burden and loss of human life. to manage annual IaV epidemics and prepare for future pandemics, an improved understanding of how IaVs emerge, transmit, cause disease and acquire pandemic potential is urgently needed. Fundamental techniques essential for procuring such knowledge are IaV isolation and culture from experimental and surveillance samples. Here we present a detailed protocol for IaV sample collection and processing, amplification in chicken eggs or mammalian cells, and identification from samples containing unknown pathogens. this protocol is robust, and it allows for the generation of virus cultures that can be used for downstream analyses. once experimental or surveillance samples are obtained, virus cultures can be generated and the presence of IaVs can be verified in 3-5 d via reverse-transcription (rt)-pcr or hemagglutination assay. Increased time frames may be required for less experienced laboratory personnel, or when large numbers of samples will be processed.
IntroDuctIon
IAVs cause seasonal epidemics that are responsible for 3-5 million severe human cases and ≥250,000 deaths worldwide annually 1 , as well as sporadic pandemics that can induce an even higher disease burden and loss of human life. Seasonal epidemics are caused by antigenic drift, a process facilitated by a combination of immune pressure and an intrinsically high IAV mutation rate. Specifically, when the hemagglutinin (HA) protein of a circulating IAV acquires mutations that enable immune evasion, such a virus can spread efficiently in humans who lack preexisting antibodies against the antigenically drifted variant. For this reason, seasonal IAV vaccines must be reformulated every 1-3 years. Pandemic IAVs emerge when novel avian IAVs, or reassortant IAVs possessing genes derived from avian, human and/or swine viruses-to which most humans lack immunity-are transmitted to humans from reservoir species (i.e., birds and swine). Five IAV pandemics occurred during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (i.e., in 1918, 1957, 1968, 1977 and 2009) ; the worst of these was the 1918 'Spanish' influenza, which was responsible for ≥50 million deaths 2 .
IAVs are diverse. Virus subtypes are categorized on the basis of the antigenic properties of the HA and neuraminidase (NA) virion surface proteins, and to date 17 HA subtypes (e.g., H1, H2 and so on) and 10 NA subtypes (e.g., N1, N2 and so on) have been identified. All HA and NA subtypes are found in avian species (with the exception of H17 and N10, which have been detected only in bats 3 ), whereas viruses of only a few subtypes are found in swine. Currently, viruses of the H1N1 and H3N2 subtypes circulate in humans; however, since 1997, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses of the H5N1 subtype (H5N1-HPAI) have occasionally transmitted from birds to humans, and to date such zoonotic events have caused at least 667 clinically confirmed human cases and 393 deaths (58.9% mortality 4 ). The steep mortality rate associated with human H5N1-HPAI infections is alarming, but the lack of efficient human-to-human transmission has, so far, prevented these viruses from causing a pandemic. Nonetheless, recent reports indicate that only a few mutations may be needed for H5N1-HPAI viruses to acquire transmission capability in mammals, and some of these mutations are already present in human isolates [5] [6] [7] . In the spring of 2013, viruses of the H7N9 subtype emerged in humans in China 8 , and the ongoing epidemic comprises >400 infections 9 . These H7N9 viruses already are capable of limited transmission in humans 10 and in mammalian infection models [11] [12] [13] [14] , suggesting that they possess pandemic potential.
Surveillance to detect IAVs in human and animal populations is necessary to guard against seasonal epidemics, as well as novel and potentially devastating pandemic viruses. In particular, routine surveillance is conducted in humans year-round, and it is crucial for monitoring influenza activity, evaluating vaccine efficacy and assisting in vaccine strain selection for upcoming IAV seasons. Surveillance is also performed in animal reservoirs to identify potential pandemic threats. Fundamentally, a successful surveillance program requires the ability to isolate, amplify and identify IAVs from various sources. In this protocol, we describe standard procedures for IAV surveillance sample collection, virus culture and virus identification, which have been developed over decades of research. The protocol is presented in three parts (a flowchart of the protocol is depicted in Fig. 1 ), focusing on sample collection and processing (Part 1); virus culture in either embryonated chicken eggs or mammalian cells (Part 2); and verification of the presence of IAVs using hemagglutination assays and RT-PCR analysis (Part 3).
Experimental design
It should be noted that this protocol is primarily designed for use in research, and it is not a clinical protocol. In addition, it is important to appreciate that the described techniques are applicable not only for surveillance samples but also for experimental Swab samples from humans (nasal, nasopharyngeal or oropharyngeal); avian species (oropharyngeal, tracheal, cloacal or fecal); and nonhuman, mammalian species (nasal, naso-or oropharyngeal, tracheal, rectal or fecal). Liquid samples from environmental sources (e.g., water from lakes or troughs in live poultry markets); experimentally infected animals (e.g., nasal wash, bronchoalveolar lavage); and humans (nasopharyngeal aspirates, naso-or oropharyngeal gargles, bronchoalveolar lavage, sputum or tracheal aspirates). Tissue samples from experimentally killed animals, or from slaughtered or dead animals (tissues may include blood, respiratory organs (nasal turbinate, trachea, bronchus and lung), intestinal tract, liver, kidney, spleen, pancreas, brain and/or other tissues).
IAV identification workflows.
Once samples have been collected, the workflow for virus identification may proceed in several ways (Fig. 1) . The 'gold standard' for IAV identification is virus culture in embryonated chicken eggs or mammalian cells, followed by a positive result in a hemagglutination assay, and subsequent verification of IAVs in HA-positive samples by use of a more specific assay, such as RT-PCR analysis of genomic • • • viral RNA (each of these methods is described in detail below). This workflow is highly sensitive, and it quickly produces a virus isolate 'stock' that can be used for further analysis and/or sent to WHO Collaborating Centre reference laboratories 21 to enable vaccine strain selection and efficacy monitoring, or to aid in the identification of unknown virus subtypes. However, the gold standard workflow is time consuming and labor intensive, and it may not be feasible when rapid results are imperative or when hundreds or thousands of samples need to be assessed. Moreover, this approach may fail to identify IAVs when viral material is present in samples but infectious virus is not because no virus will be amplified in egg or cell cultures. An alternative approach to hasten sample evaluation and ensure IAV identification in the absence of infectious virus is to directly analyze sample material by using a rapid, specific and sensitive assay (i.e., RT-PCR). Both standard and real-time RT-PCR may be suitable for this purpose 22, 23 , although real-time RT-PCR is more practical for large numbers of samples or when under a restrictive deadline because results are reported during the thermocycling procedure, without requiring subsequent gel electrophoresis and imaging steps. After the presence of IAVs has been identified by using RT-PCR, virus cultures can then be prepared only from positive samples for use in downstream analyses. One disadvantage of this 'fast' workflow is that it may report false negative results in cases in which viral RNA copy numbers are below the threshold for detection. Therefore, a third possible workflow-combining the gold standard and fast workflows-may be considered when both rapid and accurate results are needed. In this combined workflow, samples are subjected to RT-PCR analysis directly to produce a preliminary set of positives within a short time period (i.e., usually the same day). In parallel, all samples are also subjected to virus culture, with follow-up hemagglutination assays and/or RT-PCR analyses to identify a secondary set of IAV-positive samples (virus culture may increase the identification of positive samples because of amplification of low initial virus amounts). Preliminary and secondary sets of positives are then compared to identify the complete set of positive samples. Selection of the appropriate IAV identification workflow should be determined according to project needs and laboratory resources.
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Step 3C (real time) 24 ), and eggs are the preferred substrate for virus amplification from avian sources. Avian IAVs possess HA proteins that preferentially bind to terminal α2,3-linked sialic acid moieties on cell surface molecules. These are abundant on the cells that line the allantoic cavity of embryonated eggs 25 (Fig. 2a,b) , and therefore avian virus egg inoculations are directed to this region. Human IAV HA proteins prefer α2,6 sialic acid linkages and replicate in the egg amniotic cavity (Fig. 2a,b ) because both α2,3 and α2,6 sialic acids are present in this compartment 25 , although it should be noted that recent H3N2 viruses replicate poorly in this cavity [26] [27] [28] .
Historically (i.e., before the availability of cell culture systems), human viruses were grown in eggs, and currently, most seasonal influenza vaccines are still produced this way. However, some human and swine IAVs replicate inefficiently in eggs, and passaging mammalian viruses in eggs can result in the acquisition of mutations that affect receptor binding specificity and/or antigenicity 25, 29, 30 . As an alternative, IAVs can be amplified in mammalian cell cultures. Several primary and continuous mammalian cell types are suitable for IAV propagation, but the most frequently used is the Madin-Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cell line. MDCK cells were first described in 1966 (ref. 31) , and they were shown to support replication of some IAVs shortly thereafter 32 . Later studies indicated that the addition of trypsin to MDCK cultures allowed for more efficient propagation and sensitive detection of IAVs from human specimens when compared with cultures lacking trypsin [33] [34] [35] . Trypsin facilitates virus growth in MDCK cells by mediating cleavage of the virion surface glycoprotein precursor HA0 into HA1 and HA2 subunits 36, 37 , an event that is required for HA fusion with the endosomal membrane and release of genetic material into newly infected cells 38 . MDCK cells are relatively resistant to continuous culture with trypsin, and they express proteins bearing sialic acids with both α2,3 and α2,6 linkages at their surfaces 25 , making them an ideal cell type for the propagation of IAVs that do not grow well in eggs. MDCK cells are usually permissive for mammalian IAVs, but are less so for viruses derived from avian species. Of note, a recent innovation in the isolation and propagation of current human influenza viruses is the generation of MDCK cells that are engineered to express increased levels of α2,6-linked sialic acid receptors 39 . These cells may enhance the isolation of human IAVs from clinical specimens and increase virus culture titers relative to standard MDCK cells, and they can be used interchangeably with standard MDCK cells in the techniques described in this protocol.
Hemagglutination assay. A widely used, inexpensive, rapid and standard screening method for the detection of IAVs is the hemagglutination assay (originally developed by Hirst 40 and Francis et al. 41 ), which is based on the ability of the viral HA protein to bind to and 'agglutinate' red blood cells (RBCs) . HA binding to RBCs is mediated by α2,3-and/or α2,6-linked sialic acid moieties at the RBC surface. Hemagglutination assays are performed by mixing dilutions of virus-containing samples with a standard amount of RBCs in microtiter plates and observing agglutination patterns after a period of incubation. Agglutination causes RBCs to form a sheet that settles at the bottom of a well, giving a cloudy appearance, whereas the lack of agglutination results in RBCs settling to the bottom of the well in the form of a point of cells (i.e., a 'button') or a circle of cells (i.e., a 'halo'), surrounded by a relatively translucent buffer.
The amount of IAV HA protein in surveillance samples is usually insufficient to yield positive results in the hemagglutination assay; however, this assay is effective for screening large numbers of virus cultures before performing additional-more specific-diagnostic analyses (i.e., RT-PCR). Importantly, several factors need to be considered when using this assay, including the following: (i) a positive hemagglutination assay indicates the presence of viral HA protein, but it does not require infectious virus; (ii) some IAVs do not agglutinate RBCs efficiently, even if their infectivity is high; (iii) the origin of the RBCs (e.g., chicken, turkey, guinea pig or horse) can markedly affect the hemagglutination activity of an IAV, owing to species-specific expression patterns of α2,3-and α2,6-linked sialic acid moieties on RBC surfaces 42 ; and (iv) hemagglutinin proteins from other viruses (e.g., paramyxoviruses) can induce RBC agglutination, so a positive hemagglutination assay result should always be followed with a secondary assay that can specifically identify the IAV. Avian RBCs (e.g., turkey) are preferred for use in hemagglutination assays because they are nucleated, heavy and settle quickly in microtiter plates; thus, negative activity can be clearly differentiated from positive, agglutinating activity. In contrast, lighter, non-nucleated mammalian RBCs (i.e., guinea pig and human RBCs) can form halos upon settling, making the differentiation between positive and negative activity potentially less clear. Currently, circulating human H3N2 viruses lack the ability to agglutinate chicken RBCs 43 , and therefore chicken RBCs should not be used for hemagglutination assays for these viruses. In addition, some human IAVs have been shown to agglutinate guinea pig RBCs with high efficiency 44 . With these points in mind, the source of RBCs for use in hemagglutination assays should be carefully selected depending on the viruses that are expected to be present. When the hemagglutination assay is used to screen samples for the presence of IAVs, useful controls include cell culture medium or egg fluids without virus (negative control), and a sample known to contain an IAV with efficient agglutinating activity (positive control).
RT-PCR.
For specific IAV identification (from original surveillance samples or after virus culture in embryonated chicken eggs or cells), it is preferable to use a method that will detect viruses irrespective of antigenic differences in the HA protein, especially when the HA subtype of the prospective virus is unknown. Although IAV genomic sequences vary widely across subtypes and species-specific virus groups, the M gene segment is relatively highly conserved. Therefore, the presence of IAVs can be evaluated by using either standard or real-time RT-PCR with primers that recognize the M gene of viruses of all subtypes. Real-time RT-PCR is favored because results can be obtained more rapidly; however, M gene sequences amplified by using standard RT-PCR can be evaluated by using gel electrophoresis with only a modest increase in the time necessary to complete the analysis, provided that the number of samples is relatively low. For quality control purposes, an egg or tissue culture sample known to contain an IAV should be included in all procedures required for the RT-PCR analysis (e.g., RNA extraction, cDNA synthesis, PCR amplification and agarose gel electrophoresis), so that concerns about procedural efficacy can be excluded when no positive samples are identified. Importantly, care should be taken to avoid cross-contamination between the known positive sample and all other samples (e.g., by using aerosol-resistant micropipette tips and preparing the RT-PCR master mix in a clean location), and all RT-PCRs should include a no-template negative control to ensure that the reagents used are not a source of contamination.
Other assays for IAV identification. Hemagglutination assays and RT-PCR analysis are described in this protocol because they represent the most widely used and reliable methods for the identification of IAVs in surveillance samples and virus cultures. However, additional antigen-based methods also can be used for IAV identification. These include rapid, point-of care assays that can both detect and distinguish between influenza A and B viruses in ~30 min (e.g., Directigen EZ Flu A+B, Binax NOW Influenza A & B), and immunofluorescence assays using influenza-specific antibodies. It is important to note that the successful use of rapid and immunofluorescence-based assays is highly dependent on the cellularity of the sample (i.e., more cells typically produce more accurate results) 45 , and further that many reports indicate variable levels of sensitivity for these assays, which can lead to inadvertent false negative identifications (e.g., see refs. [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] . Moreover, immunofluorescence assays may require considerable sample manipulation, the use of sharp objects (i.e., glass slides) and the availability of specialized equipment (i.e., fluorescence microscopes), all of which provide significant obstacles when working under high containment conditions (i.e., in biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories). Nonetheless, both rapid and immunofluorescence-based assays are used frequently by clinical diagnostic laboratories when assessing specimens derived from humans exhibiting influenza-like illness. As a final point, serology-based assays (e.g., hemagglutination inhibition 41, 50 and microneutralization 51 ) can be used to retrospectively (and indirectly) identify IAV infection through the detection of IAV-specific antibodies in serum, but they are not useful for the direct isolation and identification of viruses from clinical or research specimens. In sum, for the reasons just described, antigen-and serology-based assays are not considered further in this protocol. 3 ). In addition, it must be emphasized that neither the hemagglutination assay nor RT-PCR analysis with M gene-specific primers can differentiate between IAV subtypes. Therefore, if a positive identification of IAV has been made for a particular sample, then subsequent analyses must be performed to identify the specific subtype (e.g., by use of subtype-specific RT-PCR primer panels 17 , genome sequencing with universal primer sets 54 or subtype-specific antibody panels in hemagglutination inhibition assays 55 ). These additional analyses are outside the scope of the current protocol, and thus they will not be discussed further here.
Safety considerations
Shipping infectious biological materials. Frequently, surveillance or other IAV-containing samples must be shipped (i.e., transferred) between national and international sites. Governmentissued import and export permits or licenses may be required for national and/or international transfer of infectious (or potentially infectious) substances. To remain compliant with national and international laws and regulations, personnel planning to import or export samples known or expected to contain IAVs should contact the appropriate national agencies to identify the required permits and licenses, and obtain the required permits and licenses before making or receiving any shipments. Only personnel trained and certified in the shipment of hazardous materials should prepare shipments of infectious substances, and only personnel trained in the handling of infectious substances should receive and unpack shipments.
Biosafety. All methods involving the manipulation of samples containing (or potentially containing) infectious IAVs must be performed in a class II biosafety cabinet (BSC) in appropriate BSL-2 or BSL-3 containment conditions, while using appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). The proper containment level and PPE requirements should be identified on the basis of the actual or potential IAVs that are (likely to be) present, before any procedures are performed. Generally, BSL-2 conditions are suitable for contemporary human IAV strains (H1N1 and H3N2). However, a higher containment level may be necessary if a strain poses a pertinent threat to human or agricultural animal populations. BSL-3 containment is required for work with HPAI viruses (e.g., H5N1); the recently emerged H7N9 viruses from China; any newly emerging human IAV for which limited knowledge is available; and historical pandemic viruses that have caused extremely high human mortality (e.g., 1918 IAV) or for which little or no immunity exists in the human population (e.g., H2N2 IAV). Personnel planning experiments with samples that are known or expected to contain IAVs must consult with institutional committees and governmental agencies to ensure that all appropriate permits and licenses are acquired before initiating any work. An excellent resource describing various types of biosafety containment and PPE is the 'Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th Edition' , which is published by the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and can be freely downloaded from the CDC website 56 . Egg sealant (e.g., paraffin wax, nail polish or Elmer's glue) PBS (prepare as described above) Anti-anti (prepare as described above) Blood-agar plates (to check for bacterial contamination) 
MaterIals

REAGENTS
Sample collection and processing Polyester fiber-tipped swabs (e.g., nylon or Dacron) with plastic or wire shafts; for each swab sample collection scenario, use the largest swab size that maintains human or animal safety  crItIcal For improved sample collection, we suggest using 'flocked swabs' (Copan Diagnostics), which have high absorbency, promote the collection of solid and semi-solid materials and efficiently elute samples into transport medium. Flocked swabs have been reported to produce better clinical specimens for diagnosis 59 ; they have outperformed standard, invasive nasal aspiration methods in the collection of IAVs from humans 60, 61 ; and they have been found to yield higher virus amounts compared with rayon swabs 62 . Calcium alginate and cotton swabs are not recommended because residues present in these materials interfere with PCR assays 63  crItIcal Use this solution only for collecting samples that will be inoculated into eggs. GSTM imparts longer-term stability to viruses than does MEM-BSA (see details about MEM-BSA preparation below), particularly when samples cannot be placed immediately on ice 16 . However, the high glycerol concentration in GSTM is not suitable for mammalian cell cultures 64 , and GSTM should not be used to collect samples that will be inoculated into MDCK cells. PBS-AA (PBS containing 1× anti-anti) Use PBS-AA for diluting samples that will be inoculated into eggs. Dilute 100× anti-anti at a ratio of 1:100 (vol/vol) in autoclaved PBS. Store PBS-AA at 4 °C and use it for up to 1 month. Embryonated chicken eggs (10-12 d old) Before use, 'candle' the eggs by placing them in front of a light source. Ensure that each egg is fertilized and viable, and that the shell is not damaged. By using a pencil or an ethanol-resistant marker, designate a position just above the interface between the air sac and the allantoic sac that is free of veins (this position will be used for inoculation; Fig. 2b ). MEM-BSA Use this for collecting samples that will be inoculated into MDCK cells and for virus culture in MDCK cells. First, prepare and store a 2× MEM-BSA solution as follows: in a 500-ml bottle, mix the following components (total solution volume 500 ml): 270 ml of dH 2 (a) swab and liquid sample collection and preparation (i) Prepare sample collection tubes for swab samples by dispensing 1-3 ml of the appropriate transport medium into sterile plastic tubes. For swab samples that will be inoculated into MDCK cell cultures, use MEM-BSA; for those that will be inoculated into eggs, use either MEM-BSA or GSTM. Use sterile plastic collection tubes without transport medium for liquid sample collections. If feasible, chill all sample collection tubes and transport buffers to 0-4 °C before use, as this temperature has been shown to preserve viral RNA, hemagglutinating activity and virus infectivity [65] [66] [67] .  pause poInt Tubes can be prepared in advance and stored at 4 °C for up to 1 week before use.
(ii) Fully saturate dry polyester fiber-tipped swabs by inserting into the target mucous membrane region, pausing for a few seconds and then removing while gently rotating and wiping as much surface area as possible. For nasal or nasopharyngeal surfaces, obtain specimens from both nostrils using the same swab. Obtain fecal samples by coating a swab tip in freshly excreted, wet fecal material. Collect liquid samples (i.e., trough or lake water and fluids from various types of aspirates or washes) directly from the source without using a swab. (iii) Immediately place saturated swabs into plastic collection tubes (prepared as described in Step 1A(i)); break off the swabs' shafts, leaving the heads immersed, close the tubes and place them on ice. For nonswab liquid samples, immediately close the collection tube and place it on ice. (iv) Transfer the samples directly to the laboratory or, if in the field, to a liquid nitrogen dry shipping container for transport. In the laboratory, store the samples that previously were not frozen at 0-4 °C if processing and inoculation can be performed within 48-72 h; otherwise, freeze the samples at −80 °C.  crItIcal step Avoid repeated freeze-thaw cycles, as each cycle reduces IAV viability 68 . Consider dividing the samples into aliquots. Samples should not be frozen or shipped on dry ice unless they are sealed, taped and double-bagged because CO 2 exposure can rapidly reduce IAV viability and infectivity 69 .  pause poInt To avoid loss of viability, do not store the samples longer than 72 h at 4 °C (refs. [65] [66] [67] . If frozen, the samples can be stored at −80 °C for a minimum of several months. However, some loss of viability will occur after the initial freeze, and further viability reductions are increasingly likely as the length of storage time is increased 68 . (v) To prepare samples for inoculation, thaw them rapidly in a 37 °C water bath or incubator (if required). Vortex vigorously and allow the debris to settle for 30 min while holding on ice. After debris has settled, advance to virus amplification steps (Part 2) and/or RT-PCR analysis (Part 3); return any remaining sample to −80 °C. Do not filter the samples.  crItIcal step It is important to avoid using microfilters to remove bacteria and fungi from samples (even fecal samples), as microfilters frequently also remove viruses. To prevent bacterial and fungal outgrowth in inoculated cultures, include antibiotics and antimycotics in all transport, inoculation and culture media, as described in Reagent Setup. to gently pierce the egg shell at the location marked during candling (i,ii in Fig. 2a-c) . Avoid cracking the egg shell. ! cautIon To avoid unnecessary sharps use in BSL-3 containment, perform all egg piercings in BSL-2 before entering BSL-3 containment to perform inoculations. (iv) For each inoculation, draw up 100 µl of sample and 100 µl of PBS-AA into a 1-ml syringe with a 27-gauge, 1-inch needle (for inoculation of the allantoic cavity) or a 1.5-inch needle (for inoculation of both the allantoic and amniotic cavities). (v) For inoculation of both the allantoic and amniotic cavities, insert the inoculation needle (1.5 inches) at a 45° angle into the pierced region of the egg, gently push through the allantoic sac and into the amniotic sac, and inject 100 µl (one half) of the inoculum (iii in Fig. 2c ). Pause to allow the inoculum to flow completely from the syringe, and then draw the needle back into the allantoic region and expel the remainder of the inoculum. For inoculation of the allantoic cavity only, insert the inoculation needle (1 inch) directly into the allantoic sac and expel the contents. ! cautIon To prevent inadvertent exposures, handle sharps (i.e., needles) with extreme caution when manipulating samples that contain (or potentially contain) infectious IAVs. In particular, we recommend using blunt-ended (not hypodermic) needles for all allantoic cavity inoculations, and to avoid performing amniotic cavity inoculationsthereby eliminating the need for hypodermic needles-whenever possible.
? trouBlesHootInG (vi) Remove the syringe and safely discard it into a sharps container within the BSC. . 2d) . Remove cracked pieces of shell and dispose of them in a container of disinfectant. ! cautIon Avoid removing the pieces of eggshell below the top of the allantoic sac to prevent premature disruption and/or allantoic fluid spills, which could result in a major biohazard.  crItIcal step Decontaminate the forceps between egg harvests by using 70% (vol/vol) ethanol or an alternative disinfectant. (xiii) To obtain the allantoic fluid, use sterile forceps, a micropipette tip or a serological pipette to gently detach the allantoic membrane from the shell and pull it toward the center of the egg, while avoiding breaking blood vessels or the yolk (ii in Fig. 2d ). Fluids will accumulate in the region between the shell and the allantoic membrane. Collect these fluids into a conical tube by using a micropipette (iii in Fig. 2d ) or a serological pipette (not shown). Typically, 5-10 ml of allantoic fluid can be collected from each egg.  crItIcal step Because the presence of blood or yolk may affect the resultant virus titer or the efficacy of downstream assays, avoid collecting egg fluids mixed with these substances.  crItIcal step If you are using forceps, decontaminate between egg harvests by using 70% (vol/vol) ethanol or another appropriate disinfectant. ? trouBlesHootInG (vi) Dilute the inoculation samples 1:100-1:1,000 (vol/vol) in MEM-BSA-TPCK. Prepare a volume that covers cells (e.g., 300 µl in a 25-cm 2 flask or 2 ml in a 175-cm 2 flask), and then vortex the dilution for 10 s to mix. (vii) Remove the final wash from the cells (from Step 2B(iv)) and cover with the inoculum (from Step 2B(vi)). Incubate the cells with inoculum for 1 h at 37 °C. During the incubation period, manually rock or tap the flasks every 10 min to evenly distribute the inoculum across the monolayer and to avoid cell drying in the flasks' central regions. (viii) At the completion of the incubation period, remove the inoculum and wash the cells once with PBS. Cover the inoculated, washed cells with MEM-BSA-TPCK, in a volume suitable for MDCK cell culture over several days (e.g., 4 ml in a 25-cm 2 flask or 25 ml in a 175-cm 2 flask). (ix) Incubate the inoculated cells in a 33-37 °C, humidified tissue culture incubator with an atmosphere of 5% CO 2 for 2-5 d, proceeding to the next step after 1 d.  crItIcal step Most mammalian viruses will grow well at 35 °C, so this is an appropriate temperature for initial isolation experiments with viruses whose properties are unknown. However, some viruses exhibit optimal growth at other temperatures (e.g., 37 °C and 33 °C), and when viral replication levels are modest alternative incubation temperatures should be considered. Do not perform medium changes during the incubation period, as this will remove most of the viruses that are present. (x) Monitor MDCK cultures microscopically on a daily basis to observe cytopathic effects (CPEs). IAV-induced CPEs include visible cell rounding and detachment from the growth surface (Fig. 3)  crItIcal step To avoid false positive results owing to carryover from previous reactions, it is essential to practice precautionary measures. Assay setup and analysis must be performed in dedicated spaces with dedicated equipment, and clean gloves must be used for setting up all assays. Equipment and workspaces should be decontaminated after each use, and if possible thermocyclers should be exposed to UV light before use. (ii) Set up a cDNA synthesis (reverse transcriptase) reaction as described below: • tIMInG part 1: sample collection and preparation for virus amplification
Step 1A(i-iv), swab and liquid surveillance sample collections: 1 h to multiple days, depending on the number and type of samples
Step 1A(v), swab and liquid surveillance sample processing: <1 h
Step 1B(i-iii), animal tissue collection: 1-6 h, depending on the number of animals
Step 1B(iv-viii), animal tissue homogenization: 1-2 h IAV-induced CPEs in MDCK cells are characterized by cell rounding and detachment from the monolayer. For actively replicating cultures, this can be verified readily by the existence of floating cellular debris in the culture medium, a loss of monolayer coverage over the surface of the plate and altered cellular morphology relative to mock-infected control monolayers (Fig. 3) . In some cases, CPEs may be more difficult to observe, particularly in earlier time points (e.g., see the CA04 panel of Fig. 3) , and thus it is crucial to always include a mock-infected control culture so that direct comparisons can be made. Complete loss of the monolayer is usually observed within 2-3 d after inoculation (data not shown). It is important to note that bacterial or fungal contamination can result in the appearance of floating debris and, on occasion, changes in the cellular monolayer. Thus, personnel examining virus cultures should note drastic changes in pH and excessive turbidity of virus culture medium, as these observations strongly suggest the presence of undesirable contaminants.
Hemagglutination assay
The results of hemagglutination assays can be directly scored by eye and do not require the use of a plate reader. As described above, agglutination causes RBCs to remain in a sheet at the bottom of wells, giving a cloudy appearance, whereas the lack of agglutination results in RBC settling to the bottom of the well in the form of a button or halo surrounded by relatively translucent buffer (see Fig. 4a for examples of each of these phenomena). A sample that is authentically HA-positive will usually exhibit agglutination at multiple dilutions, and partial agglutination may be observed in HA-positive samples at dilutions that immediately precede the first negative dilution ( Fig. 4b ; see the wells highlighted by blue circles for examples of partial agglutination). Partially agglutinated positive samples should not be mistaken for negative halos, which are observed when using mammalian RBCs. To calculate a sample's HA titer, take the reciprocal of the highest dilution at which complete agglutination is observed. For example, if the highest completely agglutinated dilution is 2 −7 , the virus is considered to have 128 HA units.
standard rt-pcr
The results of a standard RT-PCR assay are assessed by the use of agarose gel electrophoresis of the PCR product.
In Figure 5a , we show a typical result for the standard RT-PCR using universal primers to the M gene, as described in this protocol. This PCR detects M gene fragments from IAVs of a variety of origins, although variability may be observed. The results of real-time RT-PCR assays are determined by observing the normalized reporter (Rn) value for each reaction, which is calculated as the ratio of the fluorescence of the FAM dye divided by the fluorescence of a passive reference dye (ROX) at the end of each cycle. Results are reported as a C t (cycle threshold) value, which is the number of cycles required for the Rn value to intersect the threshold line (established by negative control reactions), and it is a relative measure of the concentration of target in the RT-PCR. A typical C t value for positive target amplification is ≤35.0, and the Rn value should exhibit a sigmoidal amplification curve. Any C t signal >35 cycles may be considered suspect and could require further confirmation. In Figure 5b , we show typical sigmoidal amplification curves for several different IAVs when using the real-time RT-PCR procedure described in this protocol. Some minor variability is noted between the Rn values of the viruses examined here (Fig. 5c) . It should be emphasized that, although the primers for both the standard and real-time RT-PCR assays described in this protocol are universal (i.e., designed to detect highly conserved M gene regions), it is possible that some IAVs may not be detected if primers are imperfectly matched to their M genes.
summary
The procedures described in this protocol allow the isolation, culture and identification of IAVs from different types of surveillance and research samples, and the resultant virus culture stocks can be retained and used in downstream analyses. For surveillance samples, additional subtype-specific RT-PCR (or other) assays may be performed to determine the specific HA and NA subtypes of isolated IAVs, and full genome sequencing may be used to study the phylogenetic relationships of newly isolated viruses to known IAVs that originated in humans and/or reservoir species. Moreover, the assembled human surveillance data from multiple sources may be used by public health officials to determine the severity of a particular IAV season, to assess IAV vaccine efficacy and to make recommendations for IAV vaccine strain selection for upcoming seasons. For H5N1-HPAI and H7N9 viruses isolated from animal surveillance samples, it is particularly important to identify genetic markers that are known to enhance virus growth and/or transmission in mammals (i.e., evidence for pandemic potential), and follow-up in vivo experiments should be performed to validate whether specific viruses exhibit pathogenicity or transmission in mammalian models of infection. In sum, this protocol is essential in order to enhance knowledge about IAVs that are currently circulating in humans and reservoir species, and to more clearly define potential IAV pandemic threats. coMpetInG FInancIal Interests The authors declare no competing financial interests.
